Trust and Probate Litigation partner Emma Holland and associate Rose-Marie Sage consider the use of the court’s inherent jurisdiction in trustee removal claims following recent judgments on this issue.

Trustees often find themselves navigating what they may consider to be misplaced blame, resentment and notions of entitlement on the part of beneficiaries, while simultaneously seeking to comply with their legal duties. In certain circumstances, the trustee may no longer be considered suitable for the role, and their removal is sought. For instance, in England and Wales, where capacity or solvency are at issue, section 41 of the Trustee Act 1925 (“TA 1925”) may assist.

However, in cases of hostility between beneficiaries and trustees, unless there are express powers in the trust deed, the premise for removal is likely to be the inherent jurisdiction of the court, which is founded on equitable principles. It is important to recognise that the courts will not approve every application for removal, and it will be necessary to show that the discord is such that it is likely to jeopardise the proper administration of the trust and/or the interests of the beneficiaries.

Other considerations include whether a trustee has engaged in misconduct, is incompetent in their duties or has any conflicts of interest that prevent them from acting impartially.

Use of the court’s inherent jurisdiction to remove trustees

When considering the court’s inherent jurisdiction to remove trustees, the basis of the court’s authority is outlined in Letterstedt v Broers (1884) 9 App Cas 371. In Letterstedt, the executors were removed despite there being no finding of misconduct. The Privy Council instead determined that the strained relationship between the beneficiaries and the executors was such that the trusts could not properly be executed and, therefore, the welfare and best interests of the beneficiaries were not being protected. These principles have been confirmed and endorsed in subsequent cases.

In Thomas and Agnes Carvel Foundation v Carvel [2007] EWHC 1314 (Ch), an application was made by the Thomas and Agnes Carvel Foundation to remove Pamela Carvel as personal representative and to set aside an English Chancery division court order directing the estate of Agnes Carvel to pay her over £8m. Agnes and Thomas Carvel had made mutual mirror-image wills, leaving their estates on trust to each other for life with the remainder on trust for the applicant foundation. When Thomas Carvel died, Agnes made a new will appointing Pamela as sole executrix and leaving her estate to the second respondent. A US court enforced the mutual wills agreement, entitling the applicant to the estate. Acting as executrix, Pamela obtained an English court order without notifying the foundation and sought to domesticate the English order in the US. The court granted the application to remove Pamela and replace her with an independent professional person, and the payment order was set aside. In that case, Mr Justice Lewison held that “the overriding consideration is, therefore, whether the trusts are being properly executed” or, as he put it in a later passage, the main guide must be “the welfare of the beneficiaries”.

Seymour v Ragley Trust Company Ltd & Ors [2025] EWHC 1099 (Ch)

While Letterstedt and Carvel demonstrate the breadth of the court’s inherent jurisdiction, it should also be emphasised that removal is not a decision taken lightly.

Chief Master Marsh in London Capital & Finance Plc (in Administration) v Global Security Trustees Ltd [2019] EWHC 3339 (Ch) stressed that a court “will never remove a trustee lightly”, and a mere falling out between trustees and beneficiaries would, on its own, be unlikely to lead to removal. The court’s continued stance in this regard was illustrated in the recent case of Seymour v Ragley Trust Company Ltd & Ors [2025] EWHC 1099 (Ch), discussed below.

This case revolved around the Earl of Yarmouth and his application to remove two trust corporations acting as co-trustees of three family trusts, worth around £85m and holding the family seat at Ragley Hall. The earl intimated that his parents, Lord and Lady Hertford, had led him to believe he would assume management of the estate at the age of 30, but had reneged on this.

The earl sought to rely on 58 uncategorised grounds of removal to support his case, including allegations that the trustees had aligned themselves with Lord and Lady Hertford in a family dispute that began in 2018 and had failed to exercise independent judgment. He further asserted that the trustees had neglected their duty to administer the trusts effectively, viewing them as “dynastic” and, as such, were failing to generate income for the beneficiaries. Master Brightwell grouped the various grounds into the following themes for discussion:

1. The trustees’ strategy and approach to the administration of the trusts,
2. Two disputes: one concerning land and another concerning the appointment of assets,
3. Alleged influence of Lord and Lady Hertford on the trustees, and
4. The relationship between the claimant and the trustees.

The position of the trustees was that they were “willing to stand down if the court considers that to be in the interests of the beneficiaries, and do not cling to office…[and] the trustees recognise that all of the adult beneficiaries except for the claimant oppose the removal and replacement of the trustees, and take the view that they are thus in the middle of his disagreement with the other five adult beneficiaries”.

The trustees denied any wrongdoing or breach of trust and pointed to various clauses in the trust instrument which would, in any event, relieve them of liability from such accusations. In relation to the arguments surrounding dynastic treatment, the trustees directed the court to the multiple letters of wishes made by the 8^th Marquess of Hertford, which “demonstrates… dynastic intention”.

Master Brightwell, in considering the grounds for removal, relied on the principles set out in Letterstedt and expressed the view that “when deciding whether a trustee should be removed, a breakdown in relations between the trustee and a beneficiary must, as it seems to me, be taken into account… on the other hand, friction or hostility between trustees and the immediate possessor of the trust estate is not of itself a reason for the removal of the trustees.”

The court found that there was no evidence of trustee misconduct and that the trustees were making decisions independently of Lord and Lady Hertford. While the court acknowledged that the relationship between the parties was strained, this alone did not justify removal unless it impeded the administration of the trusts, which the court concluded it had not.

The trustees had, in fact, shown a willingness to negotiate and resolve certain issues with the earl, but it was he who had not engaged. The claim was subsequently dismissed, with the court finding that the welfare of the beneficiaries was of paramount concern. It said it was “material that all the adult beneficiaries except the claimant strongly wish the trustees to stay in place”.

Fernandez v Fernandez and others [2025] EWCA 2373 (Ch) and Smith & Ors v Campbell & Ors [2025] EWHC 3011 (Ch)

While Seymour underscores the court’s reluctance to intervene in the absence of clear evidence that a trustee’s presence is materially detrimental to the trust’s administration, more recent decisions have shown that the court will exercise its inherent jurisdiction where the circumstances demand it.

In the Fernandez case, the court was faced with a prolonged breakdown in relations between the executor/trustee and several beneficiaries, compounded by conflicts of interest and significant delays in the administration of the estate. District Judge Wales concluded that although personal hostility alone does not justify removal, “this is a case in which that personal hostility now places significant hurdles in the way of finalising the administration of the estate”. The court therefore ordered the removal of the executor/trustee and the appointment of an independent professional, emphasising that the welfare of the beneficiaries and the integrity of the trust’s administration must remain paramount.

In the Smith case, the court considered an application to remove four trustees, two of whom had made highly negative remarks about the beneficiaries. The beneficiaries advanced six grounds for removal, but the court found that only the sixth ground (a breakdown in relations and a loss of trust and confidence in the trustees) was substantiated.

One trustee described the claimants as “entitled and greedy” and accused them of “complacency and deep-rooted greed” in his first witness statement, and, in an email (copied to the beneficiaries), referred to them as “overpaid idiots”. As such, Deputy Master Holden found that “whatever the provocation, in my judgment the trenchant and deeply negative views expressed by [the trustee] about the Claimants give rise to a reasonable concern that he will find it very difficult to carry out his duties as one of the trustees of the Trust with the objectivity and impartiality required”. Deputy Master Holden ordered the removal of two of the trustees who had made the remarks and instructed they be replaced with an independent professional trustee to “secure the welfare of the beneficiaries and the proper administration of the Trust”.

Key takeaways

The cases discussed illustrate that the court’s inherent jurisdiction remains a vital safeguard where the administration of a trust is compromised by conflict or mismanagement. However, while hostility between parties may in some situations justify the removal of trustees, Seymour demonstrates that this will not always be the case.

Courts will not exercise their inherent jurisdiction lightly, and it needs to be shown that the trustee’s presence is materially detrimental to the functioning and administration of the trust or estate. Mere disagreement or dissatisfaction with management decisions will generally not meet this threshold.

In practice, applicants seeking removal under the court’s inherent jurisdiction should be able to demonstrate a genuine breakdown affecting the proper administration of the trust, which may include attacks on the character of beneficiaries. Trustees are encouraged to maintain transparency, demonstrate independence and keep clear records of decision-making, especially during periods of conflict or challenge. Comments about beneficiaries’ character should be avoided, and personal opinions should not impact the trustee’s decision-making.

Ultimately, recent case law reaffirms that the court’s chief concern is the integrity of the trust’s administration and the continued welfare of all its beneficiaries.