Can a family member recover payment from an estate for caring for a relative, even where the parties never agreed a specific fee? In this article, we examine the decision in Rogers v Wills [2025] EWHC 1367 (Ch), which demonstrates that informal family arrangements can create legally enforceable obligations, with potentially significant consequences for families and estates.

The dispute in Rogers arose following the death of Ursula Wills (known as Sheila) in April 2020. Sheila and her late husband had nine children, six of whom survived them both. Under Sheila’s will, her residuary estate was divided equally between her surviving children, and her son Andrew was appointed executor. In February 2018, Sheila executed Lasting Powers of Attorney for property and finances and for health and welfare. Sheila appointed her daughter Bernadette and Andrew jointly as her attorneys, with two of their siblings appointed as replacement attorneys. From September 2017 until Sheila’s death, Bernadette acted as Sheila’s principal carer. Bernadette maintained that her mother had agreed that she would receive compensation for providing that care.

Following Sheila’s death, Bernadette withdrew £100,000 from accounts held by Sheila. She maintained that Andrew had previously told her to “just take” the money in recognition of the unpaid care, which Andrew later denied. The dispute escalated into criminal proceedings, and, in October 2022, Bernadette stood trial for theft at Bristol Crown Court. She was acquitted of this charge.

Bernadette subsequently pursued a civil claim against Andrew in his capacity as executor, seeking payment from Sheila’s estate for the care she had provided. She relied on two alternative legal bases:

1. a contract between her and Sheila, and
2. the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment.

Can arrangements between relatives create a contract?

A contract is, at its simplest, an agreement the law will enforce. It necessarily comprises an offer, acceptance, consideration (something of value to which a party is not already entitled, given in exchange for contractual promises), and an intention to create legal relations. The battleground in this case was whether the parties intended to create legal relations, despite the arrangement being between a mother and daughter in a family setting.

The fact that services pass between family members often creates an evidential difficulty. Family members commonly help one another without expecting payment and rarely record their arrangements with the formality expected in a commercial setting. That does not mean, however, that an agreement made within a family can never be legally binding.

The court must consider the parties’ words and conduct objectively and decide whether they intended to create legal relations. That exercise depends on the circumstances. The existence of a family relationship forms part of the factual context but does not create a blanket presumption that any agreement lacks legal effect. Equally, a claimant’s private expectation that they will eventually receive compensation will not, without more, establish a contract. The evidence must show a shared understanding that the care was not being provided gratuitously. Earlier authorities are sometimes described as establishing a presumption that arrangements made in a domestic or family setting are not intended to create legal relations. The judge cautioned against treating that description as an automatic rule. Intention remains a question of fact, assessed objectively from all the evidence, and the family relationship is only one part of the relevant context.

In Rogers, the court considered a detailed body of contemporaneous evidence, including family WhatsApp messages, emails, medical records, and witness evidence from family members. Having considered the evidence, the court accepted that Sheila had agreed to pay Bernadette a reasonable price for the care she provided. The parties had not agreed a specific figure. However, that omission did not make their agreement unenforceable. Where a person requests services in circumstances in which the parties understand that payment will be made, the law can require the recipient to pay a reasonable amount.

The alternative claim in unjust enrichment

Unjust enrichment is a legal doctrine that can require a person to pay for a benefit they have received at another’s expense where it would be unjust for them to retain that benefit without payment.

The court considered the position if no contract existed. Bernadette argued that Sheila’s estate had been unjustly enriched by receiving the benefit of her care without paying for it. One aspect of the argument concerned the concept of “free acceptance”; broadly, whether a person who receives services, who knows or would reasonably be expected to know that the provider expects payment, should be required to pay where they had an opportunity to reject those services but did not do so. The court concluded that free acceptance could operate as an unjust factor under English law and observed that it would have found the estate liable in unjust enrichment for the value of the care provided had the contractual claim failed.

Quantum considerations

Following the liability judgment, the court had to determine what constituted a “reasonable price” or reasonable remuneration for the care Bernadette provided.

In Rogers v Wills [2026] EWHC 2231 (Ch), District Judge Wales rejected the executor’s argument that the court should adopt the approach commonly used in personal injury claims when valuing care provided by family members. In those cases, damages for gratuitous care are typically assessed by reference to commercial care rates but are then subject to various deductions, including a discount to reflect the absence of tax and National Insurance liabilities.

The court distinguished those authorities on the basis that Bernadette’s claim was not a claim for damages arising from personal injury, but a contractual claim for payment in return for services provided. The judge held that the appropriate starting point was the probable market cost of obtaining equivalent services and that no deduction should be made for tax or National Insurance. Whether and to what extent tax was payable on any award was a matter between the claimant and HMRC.

In assessing quantum, the court focused on two questions:

• the nature and extent of the care provided, and
• the period over which that care was provided.

The evidence demonstrated that Bernadette had cared for her mother for approximately 850 days and that Sheila required continuous supervision and vigilance. The court accepted that the closest commercial comparator was a live-in carer available on a 24-hour basis, providing personal care, medical and dementia support, assistance with daily living, medication management, companionship, and overnight supervision.

Having considered evidence of commercial care costs, including contemporaneous quotations from care providers, the court concluded that Bernadette’s claim, calculated at £150 per day (approximately £6.25 per hour), was materially below the likely market cost of comparable commercial care. The court therefore awarded her £127,500 as a reasonable contractual charge for the services provided.

The quantum judgment provides useful guidance for future claims involving unpaid family care. Where it is established that the parties intended the care to be paid for, the court is likely to look to the commercial value of equivalent services when assessing a reasonable charge. The decision also highlights the importance of contemporaneous evidence, such as medical records, diaries, correspondence, and other records demonstrating both the level of care required and the period during which it was provided.

One issue remains unresolved. The court’s guidance on quantum was given in the context of a successful contractual claim. It remains to be seen whether the same approach would apply where a claimant succeeds solely on an unjust enrichment basis, particularly given the differences between contractual and non-contractual principles identified by the Supreme Court in Benedetti v Sawiris [2013] UKSC 50. A claim in unjust enrichment has a different basis. It is concerned with reversing the value of the benefit received by the defendant rather than enforcing a promise to pay. That distinction may affect valuation, including whether the recipient can establish that the particular services were worth less than their ordinary market value, sometimes described as “subjective devaluation”. Here, the court did not need to decide whether those principles would produce the same £150 daily rate because Bernadette had, on the facts, succeeded in contract.

Costs

A further judgment followed the liability decision, dealing with costs in the context of a split liability and quantum trial. In Rogers v Wills [2025] EWHC 1711 (Ch), His Honour Judge Matthews rejected the executor’s argument that costs should await the outcome of the quantum stage. Reviewing authorities including Weill v Mean Fiddler Holdings Ltd, Fluor Ltd v Shanghai and Zhenhua Heavy Industries Ltd and Langer v McKeown, he held that the general approach is that costs of a discrete stage of litigation should ordinarily be dealt with when that stage concludes, unless there is a real possibility that the later quantum determination may materially affect the parties’ entitlement to costs. The court considered that this was not such a case. Having already found that Bernadette had established a contractual entitlement to reasonable remuneration, the court regarded it as inevitable that Bernadette would recover more than a merely nominal sum at the quantum stage. Accordingly, there was no reason to postpone determination of liability-stage costs.

Bernadette was awarded her costs of the liability trial on the standard basis, together with a payment on account of £75,685.50, representing 90% of her approved liability-stage costs budget.

His Honour Judge Matthews emphasised that liability for litigation costs falls personally on the executor as the litigating party. However, he expressly declined to determine whether the executor would ultimately be entitled to an indemnity from the estate in respect of either his own costs or the costs payable to the claimant, observing that such questions are governed by Civil Procedure Rule 46.3, PD 46 and the authorities concerning executors’ indemnities, including Re Beddoe.

Why does the decision matter?

The case does not mean that every relative who provides care will have a claim against an estate. Many family members provide support based purely on affection, duty, or mutual assistance, without either person intending to create legal obligations. However, the decision shows that the court will look beyond the absence of a written agreement. A contract may arise from conversations, conduct, and the wider circumstances, even where:

1. the parties are close relatives,
2. the arrangement developed informally,
3. the parties did not take legal advice,
4. the parties did not agree an hourly rate or overall fee, and
5. payment was expected only at a later date or from the recipient’s estate.

The practical dividing line will often be whether the evidence establishes a shared understanding that the care was not being provided gratuitously.

For families, this creates a strong reason to discuss and record their intentions when one person assumes a substantial caring role. For personal representatives, the case highlights the need to investigate claims for unpaid care carefully rather than dismissing them simply because the arrangement was informal and/or arises in the context of a familial relationship.