The recent contentious probate decision in Woolfson v Woolfson involving strike out and summary judgment applications is a textbook example of how not to litigate: plead broadly, accuse widely, join everyone, ignore procedural discipline and make applications the court has no power to grant. Marcus Parker and Sophie Price review the decision.

Strike out and summary judgment applications are relatively rare visitors in contentious probate. The court is often slow to shut down will challenges at an early stage because credibility, capacity and knowledge-and-approval issues can be intensely fact‑sensitive. That is exactly why the decision in Woolfson v Woolfson is such a striking read: it shows how a probate claim can be brought to an abrupt end where the pleadings, evidence and overall conduct never get close to a triable case.

The facts

The claimant, Karen Woolfson, issued proceedings in June 2025 concerning her late mother Sheila Banks’ estate. Acting in person, she challenged a will dated 11 June 2018 (the second June 2018 will). Her challenge relied more broadly on other wills and an asserted “intergenerational” structure, advancing a wide mix of grounds, including lack of knowledge and approval, lack of capacity, undue influence, defective execution and wide-ranging allegations such as breach of trust, estoppel, restitution and “fraud and/or forgery”.

Ms Woolfson sued not only her brothers but also other family members and third parties, including a neighbour who witnessed the will. The court later noted that, even on a generous reading, some were not proper defendants to a probate claim, and in some instances, no relief was sought against them.

One of her brothers, Adrian Woolfson (the first defendant), served a defence and counterclaim to propound the second June 2018 will (ie to put it forward as the deceased’s valid will, with alternatives to earlier wills) and sought declarations as to beneficial ownership of certain assets. He applied to strike out the claim under Civil Procedure Rule (CPR) 3.4(2) and for summary judgment, including on the counterclaim. Other defendants issued strike out or removal applications, and Ms Woolfson responded with a multi‑limbed application seeking, among other things, “strike out” of disputed wills, strike out of defences and counterclaims, disclosure of “intergenerational” documents, and alternative dispute resolution (ADR).

The court’s toolkit: strike out and summary judgment

Under CPR 3.4(2), the court may strike out all or part of a statement of case where it discloses no reasonable grounds for a claim, amounts to an abuse of process, is likely to obstruct the just disposal of proceedings, or there has been a failure to comply with a rule, practice direction or court order. Under CPR 24.3, the court may give summary judgment on a claim, defence or issue where the respondent has no real prospect of success, and there is no other compelling reason for a trial. In practice, strike out is usually directed at defects on the face of the pleadings, whereas summary judgment is directed at whether the case can realistically be made good on the evidence.

The evidence problem

The evidential picture on the will was unusually strong for an early determination. The second June 2018 will was said to have been executed before two witnesses, including Benjamin Brook (a neighbour with no financial interest). The witnesses swore affidavits of due execution, and Mr Brook exhibited photographs taken at the time which, viewed together, resembled a short video of the execution. The second June 2018 will was identical to a will executed days earlier (the first June 2018 will).

On capacity, the defendants relied on extensive medical records covering 2006–2018, which they said contained no diagnosis of dementia affecting testamentary capacity at the relevant times. The court highlighted contemporaneous GP and specialist observations in April 2018, indicating Ms Banks “operates at a high level” and should not be referred to memory services. Against that, the claimant’s central point was that dementia appeared on the 2024 death certificate, years after the June 2018 wills, without cogent lifetime evidence pointing to incapacity at execution.

That distinction mattered because summary judgment is evidence-led. The court’s practical question was whether there was any pleaded case with a real prospect of success, or evidence pointing to a triable amended case. On its analysis, there was not.

How not to litigate: the missteps that proved fatal

1. Plead everything, particularise little.

The court was plainly troubled by the breadth and seriousness of the allegations, including fraud and forgery, made against multiple defendants, even legal professionals, without the particularisation that properly pleaded allegations require.

It concluded that the statements of case ranged widely in scope and time, lacked grounding in contemporaneous material, and were advanced without proper regard to truth or relevance. That fed directly into strike out for no reasonable grounds and also into the conclusion that the material was abusive and likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings.

The practical lesson is simple. In probate litigation, serious allegations are not leverage or background colour. They must be anchored in pleaded facts, set out with proper particulars and supported by a realistic route to proof. If they are not, they can become the very reason the court brings the case to an early end.

2. Sue witnesses and peripheral parties instead of focusing on the dispute.

A striking feature was the inclusion of Benjamin Brook, an attesting witness, as a defendant. The court accepted that no cause of action was disclosed against him: at most, he was a witness of fact.

The court also noted that, even on a generous interpretation, no relief was claimed against certain parties, and some were not proper defendants to the probate element of the claim. Misjoinder inflates cost and complexity and can amplify the impression that proceedings are obstructive. It also distracts from the core probate questions the court is actually equipped to determine: whether the last will is valid and, if so, whether it should be admitted to probate.

3. Treat procedure as optional.

The judgment records procedural shortcomings, including the absence of a statement of truth on the particulars of claim and the filing of extensive response materials without CPR-compliant statements of truth. The claimant also made numerous informal requests through the electronic filing system and sought a late adjournment, which the court refused as it considered she had been given access to the bundles and opportunities to inspect key material. Procedural looseness is not merely technical. In early disposal applications, it often becomes a proxy for the deeper problem: a party cannot present a clear, verified case supported by admissible evidence capable of meeting the legal tests they invoke.

4. Ask for orders the court cannot make.

Perhaps the most telling misstep was the claimant’s application to “strike out” the wills themselves. The court stated it had no jurisdiction to strike out testamentary documents in that way. Once the claim was struck out and the counterclaim succeeded, the remaining limbs of the claimant’s application (including disclosure requests and ADR) served no purpose.

The wider point is practical: applications must match both the rule relied on and the remedy the court is empowered to grant. Unsupported or misconceived applications can reinforce the conclusion that proceedings are being pursued in a way that is inconsistent with the proper use of court process. The court framed the key question as whether the claimant had a pleaded case with a real prospect of success, or evidence disclosing such a case (or another compelling reason for trial). It concluded she did not. It struck out the claim and response documents and granted summary judgment on the claim, also indicating that the material was abusive or obstructive.

The court granted summary judgment for Adrian Woolfson on the counterclaim to propound the second June 2018 will, identifying the evidence of due execution required in the probate context and concluding it was satisfied. With the will admitted, earlier wills became irrelevant and the claimant’s remaining applications fell away.

Woolfson is a reminder that contentious probate is not a procedural safe harbour. Where pleadings are incoherent, allegations are serious but unparticularised, parties are joined without proper basis and the evidence cannot realistically sustain the pleaded grounds, the court may use the available procedural tools decisively, bringing the litigation to an end. It is a cautionary tale: probate disputes may be fact-sensitive, but that does not excuse undisciplined pleading, diffuse party strategy or evidential speculation dressed up as a case.