Mining arbitrations in Africa: a data-led perspective on the “new wave”

Africa’s mining sector is seeing a “new wave” of disputes. But what is really cresting the surface, and what lies beneath? Drawing on original research into mining-related investor-state arbitrations since 2020 and insights from London International Disputes Week 2026, in this article we explore the disputes shaping the emerging “new wave” across the region within the wider context of the longstanding gap between Africa’s mineral wealth and the value ultimately derived from it.

Across Africa, the mining sector is undergoing a period of recalibration. A combination of reforms and regulatory frameworks affecting existing mining projects signals a broader reassessment of how mineral wealth is governed and generates value. In parallel, a “new wave” of investor state mining arbitrations involving certain African jurisdictions is emerging, characterised (at least in part) by a recent concentration of such dispute activity in certain states.

This article draws inspiration from two sources: an analysis of investor state mining arbitrations across Africa from 2020 to date and themes explored at the Stewarts hosted London International Disputes Week 2026 (LIDW26) panel, “Whose mine is it anyway?”. Together, these sources provide two lenses through which the question of mining-related disputes in Africa might be assessed.

Importantly, such developments exist within a wider, complex context. That context is characterised, in particular, by the gap between Africa’s wealth of minerals in an increasingly mineral-hungry world and the ultimate value African states realise from them to the benefit of their economies and, ultimately, their people. The significance of that gap is increasing, not least as global demand for critical energy transition minerals rises and, in tandem, African economies look to move through their own development cycles. The context is further shaped by a broader and increasingly acute tension between the obligation of states to manage natural resources in the public interest and investors’ reliance on stability, predictability and enforceable legal protections. It was this tension that inspired the title of the Stewarts event at LIDW26.

This article explores the emerging “new wave” of disputes, provides a snapshot of data analysis on certain jurisdictions that may illustrate it and examines the wider context in which those disputes arise, namely, Africa’s mineral wealth (and the value it generates), competing objectives in the mining landscape and, ultimately, the role of arbitration.

The “new wave”

Across a number of African jurisdictions, mining frameworks are actively being revisited through a combination of licence cancellations, fiscal reforms, increased state participation and the introduction of new regulatory conditions.

These developments appear to be driven by a range of overlapping factors, including elements of resource nationalism, domestic political and economic pressures, the demands of the energy transition and an increased focus on ESG and sustainability considerations. Recent activity across certain jurisdictions illustrates the breadth of this trend. To give some examples:

In Guinea, more than 100 mining licences were cancelled in mid-2025 as part of a broader effort to restructure the sector and reallocate underutilised assets spanning bauxite, gold, graphite, iron ore and diamonds. This has been accompanied by more recent measures, including a reported ban on raw gold exports in June 2026.
In Mali, a 2019 mining code shortened a 30-year “stability period” (which had previously protected investors from tax changes) and eliminated VAT exemptions. A new mining code introduced in 2023 expanded state and local ownership requirements, with mandatory equity participation rising from 20% to 35%. Subsequent measures in late 2025 saw the revocation of over 90 exploration permits across a range of minerals, including gold, iron ore, bauxite, uranium and rare earths.
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the state has recently reclaimed more than 12,000 square kilometres of mining territory spanning an area rich in gold, diamonds and bauxite. This forms part of a broader campaign which, since 2023, has reportedly recovered over 50,000 square kilometres of mining territory.

These developments are taking place alongside what seems to be a concentration of investor-state mining arbitrations involving certain African states and what may be defined as a “new wave” of disputes in the region. This article next turns to an analysis, from which Data (defined below) is drawn. The Data shows patterns emerging in certain jurisdictions which may be evidence of the “new wave”. It illustrates the concentration of cases in certain jurisdictions and their intersection with wider regulatory developments. It also indicates a structural shift in both how and why such disputes are arising.

Facts and figures

The analysis extends beyond the perceived “new wave” of mining disputes. It spans all mining‑related investor‑state arbitrations (whether treaty- or contract-based) brought (or contemplated) against Central, East, South and West African states (as regionally defined by the African Union) over a defined period, namely from 1 January 2020 to date (as at 24 June 2026) (the “Defined Period”), so far as the data sources examined reveal this information (the “Scope”).

The analysis remains ongoing. However, patterns emerge in a number of jurisdictions ie, Guinea, Niger, Burundi, Mali and the DRC, which may be illustrative of the “new wave”. A high-level snapshot of current key findings in those jurisdictions is set out below (the “Data”).

Methodology

The process for the broader analysis out of which the Data arose involved a review of publicly available sources. The Jus Mundi case database and the ICSID case database were used as the starting point, supplemented by cross-checking against the UNCTAD Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, the PCA case database and the italaw repository, as well as Global Arbitration Review reporting.

Both database and manual filtering were applied according to the Scope, including by date, arbitration type and industry (ie, mining). Individual cases were then analysed.
Applying that methodology, a total of 43 mining arbitrations were identified over the Defined Period, spanning all African regions within the Scope. This total represents the number of investor-state mining arbitrations brought against African states according to the Scope during the Defined Period. However, as above, they are not all necessarily linked to the “new wave” of mining disputes. For reference, the regions and states captured were:

Western Africa ie, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal.
Eastern Africa ie, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Tanzania.
Central Africa ie, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Congo, the DRC and Equatorial Guinea.
Southern Africa ie, Mozambique, South Africa and Zambia.

Returning to the theme of a perceived “new wave”, the Data below relates to Guinea, Niger, Burundi, Mali and the DRC. In those specific jurisdictions, patterns emerged that may be illustrative of the perceived trend. Those findings are by year-on-year figures, the resources subject to dispute, the facts giving rise to the relevant dispute and arbitration types.

The findings in the Data are derived entirely from the methodology described above, reflect publicly reported cases only and should therefore be regarded as indicative, not definitive. The Data is otherwise accurate as at the end of the Defined Period.

Findings in year-on-year figures

The following supports the proposition that in certain jurisdictions, there has been a recent, concentrated increase in mining-related investor-state arbitration activity.

In Guinea, a total of five mining-related arbitrations were identified over the Defined Period. All five were brought between 2025 and 2026, compared with no identified cases in the preceding five years (from the beginning of 2020 to the end of 2024).
A similar pattern is evident in Niger, in respect of which a total of four cases were identified over the Defined Period. All four cases were brought between 2024 and 2025, following a four-year period (from the beginning of 2020 to the end of 2023) in which no such disputes were identified.
In Burundi, two cases were identified over the Defined Period. Both of those cases have been brought in 2026 so far, following the preceding six-year period in which, again, no disputes were identified.

The above jurisdictions provide the clearest examples of claims arising within recent and relatively compressed periods. In Mali and the DRC, the identified disputes arose at different points throughout the Defined Period.

In Mali, three cases were identified over the Defined Period. Two commenced in 2021 and one in 2024.
In the DRC, three cases were identified over the Defined Period, commencing in 2021, 2023 and 2025.

Findings by resource

In Guinea, the five disputes concern bauxite (three cases), gold (one case) and graphite (one case).
In Niger, all four of the cases relate to uranium.
In Burundi, the two cases pertain to coltan (columbite-tantalite, a metallic ore which produces tantalum used primarily in technology) (one case) and gold (one case).
In Mali, all three identified disputes concern gold.
In the DRC, two of the three disputes concern lithium (one case) and cobalt and copper (one case). The remaining dispute did not concern any particular resource (covered in further detail below).

These resources have wider strategic, technological or global energy-transition significance. As explained later in more detail, their significance is key to understanding why these disputes may be arising now and why they may become more prominent still in the future.

Findings by facts

Across these jurisdictions, the surrounding facts and context giving rise to investor-state mining disputes show a high degree of consistency.

In Guinea:

All five identified claims arise from a combination of revocation or cancellation of mining permits and licences and refusals to execute or give effect to operating arrangements.
All five claims also follow the state’s mid 2025 cancellation of over 100 mineral exploitation permits, as referenced above.

In Niger:

All four cases arise from a combination of the revocation or withdrawal of mining licences and the removal of control over mining assets.
Three of these cases are brought by the same investor, citing the state’s mid-2025 nationalisation plans concerning the mine at the centre of the dispute. The remaining case followed a restructuring of the government post-coup.

In Burundi:

Both cases arise from the suspension of mining permits and were brought (by different investors) within one month of each other.
Both cases also follow a temporary 2021 decision to suspend various international mining operations, and, in 2023, a new mining code under which the state now holds a 15% stake in all mining projects.

In Mali:

The three identified disputes concerned the refusal to extend mining rights, tax obligations and the distribution of proceeds arising from the sale of a mine, and the implementation of revised arrangements affecting a major mining project.
All three disputes arose in the context of significant reforms to Mali’s mining framework, with the first two following the introduction of the 2019 Mining Code and the third following the 2023 Mining Code.

In the DRC:

Two of the three identified disputes concerned the revocation of mining permits or mining rights. Both arose in the context of the recovery of mining territory from 2023 onwards and subsequent revocations of mining licences.
The third case concerned alleged interference with an investor operating in the mining services sector. This dispute pre-dated the broader state measures discussed above.

Findings by arbitration type

Investor‑state arbitrations are typically brought under three broad categories of instruments, or a combination of them: treaties, contracts and domestic investment law, including mining codes. Traditionally, the most common instrument for investor-state arbitrations has been treaties, particularly bilateral investment treaties. In these cases, however, a more mixed picture emerges.

In Guinea, while three of the five cases invoked bilateral investment treaties, two were in combination with domestic investment law, and the remaining two cases relied on domestic investment law, with one of those in combination with contract.
In Niger, none of the four reported cases invoked treaties; all were contract‑based, with at least one also relying on domestic investment law.
In Burundi, both of the two claims identified appear to be grounded in contract.
In Mali, two of the cases invoked domestic investment law, and the third invoked contract.
In the DRC, the two cases that concerned the revocation of mining permits or rights invoked domestic investment law.

Taken together

These findings point to four broader features of the investor-state mining arbitration landscape across the African jurisdictions considered:

A concentration of mining-related investor-state arbitrations within particular jurisdictions and periods, with multiple claims arising in relatively compressed, and in some cases recent, timeframes.
A focus on minerals of wider strategic and economic importance, including those linked to the global energy transition.
A predominant pattern of disputes following state measures affecting mining rights, with only one clear exception in the DRC.
A diverse range of legal instruments through which arbitrations are advanced, potentially indicative of a shift toward contract-based and domestic law mechanisms.

This third point is perhaps the most interesting. It shows acutely the tension between States looking to renegotiate or reset the bargain to better exploit their natural resource wealth and the expectations that investors have in respect of the stability of their investments.

The above findings, however, also cannot be taken in isolation. There is a wider and important context covering Africa’s mineral wealth, the global energy transition and the longstanding imbalance in where value from mineral extraction is ultimately captured.

Africa’s mineral wealth and the value it generates

Africa is home to an estimated 30% of global critical minerals. It produces 40% of gold, up to 90% of chromium and platinum, and holds some of the largest known reserves of cobalt, diamonds and uranium in the world. Despite this, the continent accounts for only 5.5% of global mineral production and is estimated to forego up to approximately 60% of the potential revenues associated with its critical mineral wealth.

Africa’s resources are also central to the global energy transition. The continent holds vast deposits of key energy transition minerals, including copper, cobalt, nickel, lithium and graphite. Yet, Africa captures less than 1% of the total economic value generated by the green technologies its minerals make possible.

This gap between mineral wealth and generated value is not new: Africa has long supplied raw materials, while much of the resulting revenue is realised elsewhere. What is new, however, is that Africa may now have greater leverage to close that gap than at any point in the past.

Global demand for critical minerals is projected to increase significantly, potentially up to fivefold by 2035. Meeting this demand will require substantial investment, with an estimated US$500-600bn needed in mining between now and 2040. At the same time, emerging supply constraints, particularly of key transition minerals, are further raising the stakes. Current projections indicate a potential 30% shortfall in copper supply by 2035, alongside a projected lithium deficit through the 2030s.

These forecasts suggest that global markets will increasingly depend, both at scale and with urgency, on resources concentrated in Africa, strengthening the hand of resource-rich African states and creating an opportunity to address the longstanding value imbalance.

It is against this backdrop that a number of African countries are taking steps to redefine how value is captured from their mineral wealth. One can understand why they seek to do so, given the aforementioned statistics. But in so doing, they may be opening themselves up to investor claims.

The underlying tension

Underpinning the current mining disputes in Africa is that central tension between states and investors. This tension was the focus of the LIDW26 panel discussion.

At its most basic, it reflects a divergence between the respective positions of African states and overseas investors. States retain sovereign ownership over their natural resources and are subject to ongoing obligations to manage those resources in the interests of their populations. At the same time, the development of those resources has, in many cases, depended on significant inflows of private (and almost always overseas) capital, with investors historically providing that capital in return for long-term mining rights and concessions, which ensure stability and predictability over the life of a project.

However, the bargain between the provision of capital from investor to state on the one hand, and the stability of legal and regulatory frameworks from state to investor on the other, has been coming under strain. Changing economic conditions, evolving political priorities and shifting expectations as to how value should be derived from mineral extraction have all contributed to that shift.

This gives rise to a set of competing interests. Investors rely on legally enforceable rights, grounded in the instruments defined above. States, meanwhile, operate under a further set of expectations, duties and pressures, including obligations to manage public resources, respond to domestic political and economic priorities and ensure that resource development contributes meaningfully to broader national objectives.

That tension is particularly evident in the need to balance two other competing imperatives. On the one hand, states continue to rely on external investment and must maintain frameworks capable of attracting and retaining capital, an objective that is becoming increasingly critical in light of Africa’s significant deposits of key energy transition minerals. Conversely, measures aimed at rebalancing value distribution, asserting greater control over mineral assets or revisiting existing arrangements can create uncertainty for investors and affect perceptions of stability.

In parallel, states are increasingly expected to align resource development with broader ESG and sustainability objectives, adding a further layer of complexity to the policy environment.

These overlapping objectives can pull in different directions, requiring states to balance immediate economic pressures, longer-term development goals and the expectations of both investors and domestic stakeholders. It is within this context that the wider developments described above are to be understood. They can reflect, in part, attempts to reconcile these competing pressures.

The role of arbitration

Arbitration sits at the centre of the “new wave” of disputes emerging across Africa. The extent to which that role may be evolving was a further theme discussed by the LIDW26 panel. The changing nature of the disputes landscape raises questions about whether existing arbitral frameworks remain fully fit for purpose, given the ever-increasing sociopolitical role that mining and mining disputes play across the region. Two issues stand out.

Scale of arbitral awards

The first is the size of sums sought in investor-state arbitrations. This has attracted increasing scrutiny in recent years, particularly following the decision in The Federal Republic of Nigeria v Process & Industrial Developments Limited [2023] EWHC 2638 (Comm), where a lot of the focus of the commentary was on the sheer scale of the award in question: some US$6.6bn in damages, with interest, which had accumulated to over US$11bn. The scale of awards (or, more directly, sums sought) in these types of arbitrations is evident from one of the Guinea cases identified in the analysis, under which the investor seeks almost US$29bn from the state. That sum alone is almost equivalent to Guinea’s entire nominal GDP in 2025.

During the LIDW26 panel, the question was posed whether such damages claims are inflated. An economics and quantum specialist disagreed, stating that such damages claims reflect the capital‑intensive and long‑term nature of mining projects, and so the corresponding return on investment, together with the valuation methods typically applied, including discounted cash flow analysis. In that sense, the scale of awards reflects the true characteristics of the projects and the accuracy of the methods used to value them.

Context-conscious tribunals

The second issue concerns the role of tribunals. Mining disputes, in the ways explained above, are increasingly engaging questions that extend beyond the immediate legal framework, including sustainability considerations, development priorities and the strategic importance of particular minerals. Tribunals ruling on such disputes will inevitably find themselves facing arguments grounded not in law, but in political imperative. This raises a more difficult question: what role, if any, should those wider considerations play in the private, arbitral process?

The answer may lie in arbitrator selection. Some arbitrators will be more attuned to those considerations than others. What arbitration allows for is the ability for parties to appoint arbitrators with the relevant expertise, including familiarity with the technical, economic or policy context in which such disputes arise.

These viewpoints do not displace the central role of arbitration. Rather, they illustrate the adaptability of arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism. The question is therefore less whether arbitration is fit for purpose, and more how it continues to evolve in response to the disputes brought before it. Indeed, if arbitration is not fit for purpose, what better replaces it?

Closing remarks

The “new wave” of disputes across Africa thus reflects a recalibration of how value is asserted, protected and contested in Africa’s mining sector. It also signals a realignment in the relationship between states and investors in respect of the control and value of mineral resources. Against that backdrop, arbitration remains central, but not static. As the balance between state priorities and investor interests continues to shift, so too will the disputes that arise and the framework called upon to resolve them.

Find out more

For further information on the themes discussed in this article, please contact Daniel Wilmot or Rafaella Salerno.