Earlier this year, in Gilbert v Broadoak Private Finance Ltd [2026] EWHC 153 (KB), the High Court clarified the limits of Chabra relief (freezing relief against non-parties) where the respondent is located abroad. The decision makes clear that even cases with otherwise strong merits cannot overcome a failure to satisfy the strictly applied jurisdictional tests for service out of the jurisdiction. Partner Ed Holmes, associate Ronak Mahdavi Jovainy and paralegal Veronica Bateman review the decision.

What is Chabra relief?

Chabra relief, which emerged from TSB Private Bank International SA v Chabra [1992] 1 WLR 231, is a form of interim relief that enables the freezing of assets held by a non-party (ie someone who is not a defendant to the underlying claim) to prevent their dissipation by the defendant. The idea is that this is appropriate where there is good reason to suppose that a judgment against the underlying defendant could be enforced against the assets in question. That might be so, for example, where the asset is in the name of a non-party but is in fact beneficially owned by the underlying defendant.

Factual background

The claimants were an investor, Mr Gilbert, and his company. The defendant to the underlying claim was Broadoak, a property financing company in England, whose majority shareholder and principal director was Mr Bleakley. The claimants had already obtained separate freezing relief against Broadoak and Mr Bleakley. However, they were now applying for Chabra relief against Mr Bleakley’s wife (from whom he was separated) and KSC, a Spanish company owned by Mr Bleakley and of which Mrs Bleakley was a director.

The underlying dispute related to the non-payment of debts owed by Broadoak to the claimants. The claim was successful, and the claimants had already recovered £600,000 of the judgment debt with about £4.2m outstanding. Upon investigation, the claimants discovered approximately £7m received by Broadoak, which could not be accounted for and which no longer remained in its bank accounts. It appeared that Broadoak had paid large amounts to Mr Bleakley, Mrs Bleakley and KSC for no proper purpose, including on luxury cars, jewellery and watches, with some of the payments having been made after receipt of a letter before action.

The claimants applied without notice for a worldwide freezing order (WFO) against Mrs Bleakley and KSC under the Chabra jurisdiction, on the basis of the above asset dissipation. The court initially granted the WFO up to a £3.9m limit, with permission to serve the application in Spain. At the return date hearing, the respondents sought to discharge the WFO on various grounds, including that the application failed to meet the gateway requirements for service out of the jurisdiction.

No jurisdiction for Chabra relief

The court discharged the WFO for lack of jurisdiction, holding that none of the jurisdictional gateways were applicable. The court addressed the relevant gateways as follows:

• Gateway 3 (where the respondent is a necessary or proper party to the claim). The claimants appeared to rely primarily on this gateway, arguing that Mrs Bleakley and KSA were necessary and proper parties to the underlying claim against the anchor defendant, Broadoak. However, fatally, final judgment had already been entered against Broadoak such that no substantive or procedural issues remained to be tried. Nor could the claimants rely on a new claim which they had issued but not served against the present respondents, with no application having been made by reference to that claim.
• Gateway 2 (claims made for an injunction ordering the defendant to do or refrain from doing an act within the jurisdiction). Although Mrs Bleakley had a bank account in the jurisdiction, there was binding House of Lords authority in Siskina (Owners of cargo lately laden on board) and Others v Distos Compania Naviera SA [1979] AC 210 to the effect that Gateway 2 does not apply to freezing injunctions (or other interlocutory injunctions); it only applies to injunctions sought as final, substantive relief.
• Gateway 10 (claims made to enforce judgments). The court concluded, based on Linsen International Ltd v Humpuss Sea Transport Pte Ltd [2011] EWHC 2339 (Comm), that this gateway is not available in applications for Chabra relief, which is ancillary in assisting enforcement and not a claim or application to enforce a judgment against the underlying defendant.
• The claimants’ reliance on Gateways 11 (claims relating wholly or principally to property within the jurisdiction) and 20 (claims made under an enactment allowing proceedings to be brought) also failed. The court concluded that the Chabra relief application was not concerned with the English judgment debt, but rather the specific assets held by the non-party respondents in Spain. Further, although the application was made under section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, that enactment did not allow proceedings to be brought. Rather, section 37 is concerned with the availability of remedies “in proceedings that are otherwise properly brought”.

The court discharged the WFO notwithstanding that the other conditions for Chabra relief were satisfied. The court noted that this may seem harsh, but any widening of the rules on service out was up to the Civil Procedure Rules Committee (the body responsible for making and amending the Civil Procedure Rules).

Comment

The claimants were scuppered by the fact that the underlying claim had concluded some six months before the return date hearing. This meant they could not say that the respondents to the Chabra relief application were necessary and proper parties to ongoing proceedings. This serves to emphasise the importance of making asset restraint applications in a timely fashion and, if relying on the necessary and proper party gateway, ensuring that the underlying claims are still live.

Furthermore, the claimants could not rely on the new claim they had issued but not served. Had they issued that claim earlier or applied on the basis of that new claim, the outcome may have been different. In those circumstances, it would also have been possible to apply for conventional freezing relief, ie on a non-Chabra basis, as Mrs Bleakley and KSC were parties to that underlying new claim.

The claimants’ attempts to rely on the alternative jurisdictional gateways seemed more ambitious, but the court has provided helpful guidance as to their availability (or lack thereof) in interim freezing relief applications.

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